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INTRODUCTION
R
enewable energy plays an important role in mitigating
climate change by reducing carbon dioxide emissions,
advancing energy security by diversifying an energy
mix and reducing the impact of fossil fuel price uncertainty, and
stimulating economic development by generating jobs, increas-
ing incomes, and reducing poverty. The key to successful renew-
able energy development is the implementation of a sound legal,
policy, and regulatory framework that will attract large-scale
investment in renewable energy.
RENEWABLE ENERGY — GLOBAL STATUS
& WORLD BANK EFFORTS
Renewable energy is making a difference in the way the
world meets its power needs. In 2005, worldwide renewable
power capacity expanded to 182 gigawatts (“GW”), excluding
large hydropower, which is
about four percent of global
power sector capacity. Develop-
ing countries have 44 percent of
this capacity. The top six coun-
tries were China (42 GW), Ger-
many (23 GW), the United
States (23 GW), Spain (twelve
GW), India (seven GW), and
Japan (six GW). Counting tradi-
t iona l  b iomass  and  la rge
hydropower, renewable energy
supplies seventeen percent of the
world’s primary energy. Invest-
ment in new renewable energy
reached U.S. $38 billion in 2005.
Forty-nine countries have renewable energy targets and promo-
tion policies in place, including fifteen developing countries, 
and the list is growing.1
At the 2004 International Conference on Renewable Ener-
gies in Bonn, Germany, the World Bank Group (“WBG”) com-
mitted to increasing lending for renewable energy (“RE”) and
energy efficiency projects by an average of at least twenty per-
cent per year for the next five years. For the second year in a row,
the WBG has outperformed its Bonn target. In fiscal year 2006,
the WBG’s financial support for renewable energy and energy
efficiency was U.S. $860 million. Commitments for new renew-
able energy2 and energy efficiency were U.S. $668 million, more
than double the Bonn twenty percent target. This represents a 45
percent increase over the amount of commitments made by the
WBG to new renewable energy and energy efficiency in fiscal
year 2005.3
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR
GRID-CONNECTED RENEWABLE ENERGY
Twenty-five years of experience with successful renewable
energy programs demonstrates that the implementation of an
enabling environment of legal, policy, and regulatory frame-
works that will attract large-scale capital investments is instru-
mental. Key success factors for RE policies require a legal and
regulatory framework that ensures fair and open grid access and
stable tariffs for Independent Power Producers (“IPPs”). Long-
term price predictability through long-term power purchase
agreements (“PPAs”) with transparent and adequate pricing is
the most important factor to attract investors. 
Experience from industrialized countries shows that deregu-
lating the power sector has the potential to expand service,
attract private investment, and attract IPPs to the market, which
appears to be essential for
renewable energy development.
However, the privatization of the
power sector is inherently
biased against capital-intensive
investment in RE.4 Privatized
utilities are more reluctant to
purchase intermittent renewable
energy resources. However, an
effective legal framework can
establish policies to promote
renewable energy. 
It is essential that RE be
considered early in the design of
power sector reforms, not after
the reforms are complete. Power
sector structures influence the
approach to RE market penetration. Vertically integrated utilities
provide economies of scale, but the amount of RE capacity is
determined by a monopoly that may be resistant to change, and
there is little risk sensitivity. In an unbundled system, competi-
tion exists, and the market rules allow more flexibility. In addi-
tion, increased opportunities exist for private generators to
compete though they may need special treatment, and each actor
manages his/her own risk. In such cases, long-term contracts are
important.5
To date, three major mandated market policy options to pro-
mote RE operate in the marketplace: (1) price-based feed-in
laws, which require mandatory purchase of renewable energy at
a fixed price (i.e., used in Germany, Spain, and France); (2)
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quantity-based renewable energy portfolio standards (“RPS”),
which require a minimum share of power or a minimum level of
installed capacity in a given region is met by renewable energy
(i.e., used in Australia, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, some
states within the United States); and (3) tendering mechanisms,
which involves government-sponsored competitive bidding
processes for the acquisition of renewable electricity whereby
long-term contracts are awarded to lowest priced projects (i.e.,
used in the British Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation, Ireland, and Cal-
ifornia). All these three mandated market policies ensure the
right for the RE power suppliers to recover incremental costs
between RE and conventional energy from consumers and to
connect to the grid. Each approach has its own advantages and
disadvantages. 
Feed-in laws produce high penetration rates in a short
period, create local manufacturing opportunities, provide strong
incentives for private investments, and can be cost effective if
the tariff is periodically and wisely adjusted. To date, feed-in
laws demonstrate the highest installation rates for RE and are
considered most desirable by investors given their price cer-
tainty. RPS mechanisms are good at reducing cost and price with
competitive bidding, yet tend to favor least-cost technologies
and established industry players unless separate technology tar-
gets or tenders are put in place. They are also more complex to
design and administer than feed-in laws. Tendering policies are
effective at reducing cost, but ensuring that signed contracts are
realized is a key challenge.6
The types of instruments selected should be based on objec-
tives, country conditions, and power sector structure. There is no
single solution. The effectiveness of a particular policy will rely
on how well it is designed and enforced. A case study of China
Renewable Energy Law, described later in this article, provides
insights and lessons on how these policy instruments are
selected, designed, and applied. A comparison of these three pol-
icy options is summarized in the table below.
Each policy option must consider who will pay for the
incremental costs between renewable energy and conventional
energy sources, whenever appropriate. Passing costs onto cus-
tomers by way of systems benefits charge, a carbon tax on fossil
fuel, or a dedicated fund financed by the government or with
donor support are the most frequently used approaches for cov-
ering this incremental costs and funding the various policy
measures. 
Furthermore, a range of financial incentive policies can
level the playing field between conventional energy and RE
investments. These policies can decrease upfront capital costs
through subsidies, reduce capital and operating costs through tax
credits, improve revenue streams with carbon credits, and pro-
vide financial support via loans and guarantees. Experience
demonstrates that output-based incentives are generally prefer-
able to investment-based incentives for grid-connected RE. The
investment-based mechanisms do not necessarily provide incen-
tives to generate electricity or maintain the performance of the
RE plants once they are installed, while the output-based incen-
tives promote the desired outcome — generation of electricity
from RE.8
Finally, various models of public-private partnership for
financing renewable energy exist. In general, public sector funds
must be highly targeted to catalyze, not displace, private capital.
Public funds can be used to support infrastructure development
through methods such as loans and equity investment in compa-
nies and projects, business development, marketing campaigns,
technical assistance, research and development, standards devel-
opment, and public awareness.
Renewable Energy Policy Options Comparison7
Quantity Cost/ Resource Market Local Investor Simplicity
Of RE Price Diversity Sustainability Industry Certainty
Development Reduction Development
Feed-In Large Cost efficient Excellent Technically & Excellent Can reduce Most
Laws amounts RE if the tariff is economically investor risk simple to
in short time periodically sustainable with price design,
and wisely guarantee & administer,
adjusted PPA enforce, & contract
RPS If enforced, RPS and Favor Technically & Favor Lack of price More
can meet tendering least-cost economically least-cost certainty complex to
realistic best at technologies sustainable technologies difficult for design &
targets reducing & established investors/PPA administer
cost & industry can reduce & complex
price with players risk for generators
competitive
bidding
Tendering Related only Good at Favor Tied to Favor Can provide More
to quantity reducing least-cost resource least-cost certainty if complex 
RE established cost technologies planning technologies well designed than feed-in, 
by process sustainable process & established (more risk simpler than RPS
if planning industry than feed-in)
supported, players
stable funding
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LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS FOR
OFF-GRID RENEWABLE ENERGY
In many sparsely populated and remote areas, off-grid RE
can provide least-cost solutions to rural electrification compared
to grid extension or fossil fuel based options, such as diesel and
kerosene. These renewable energy resources are fueled by
indigenous resources and are environmentally benign. In addi-
tion, off-grid RE, particularly RE mini-grids, can also contribute
to productive uses and social services, as well as generate heat,
motive power, and other non-electric energy. Compared to fossil
fuel based options, however, off-grid RE has unique characteris-
tics with high upfront investment requirements but low energy
costs. 
It is essential that the rural electrification planning and pol-
icy frameworks clearly define the roles and criteria for grid
expansion and off-grid options and ensure a level playing field
between grid and off-grid alternatives. Grid extension and 
off-grid options should complement each other rather than 
compete. In locations where off-grid RE systems are the most
economically viable option, governments should explicitly 
consider and encourage diffusion of these options in lieu of 
grid extension. In dispersed
markets where often multiple
service providers exist, the gov-
ernment should encourage busi-
ness expansion and competition
through the establishment of a
conducive institutional and reg-
ulatory environment. 
The regulation of mini-
grids, whether from RE or con-
ventional sources, must be
performed in different ways rel-
ative to the same regulatory
tasks for grid extension. Mini-grid electrification uses different
business models and often requires the need to coordinate tariffs
with subsidies. Utilities and major private sector players with
large financial resources generally invest in grid extensions.
Mini-grids, on the other hand, are usually developed by local
entrepreneurs or community-based organizations. Currently,
most mini-grid service providers are often not regulated or are
over-regulated. The regulatory frameworks for mini-grids should
allow “light-handed” procedures and processes, and the regula-
tor should delegate regulatory tasks to the rural electrification
agency or rural electrification fund that inevitably is the de facto
regulator. The regulatory framework should also permit private
sector entities to enter the market, and ensure fair competition
for all service providers.9
Tariffs allowing the RE providers to recover their costs are
probably the single most important factor determining the long
term commercial viability of mini-grid and other rural electrifi-
cation projects. However, it is usually unrealistic to expect a full
cost-recovery tariff, given the low ability to pay in rural areas. It
is important to keep a balance between ensuring commercial
viability of the service providers and meeting rural consumers’
ability to pay.10 Rural household surveys in many developing
countries demonstrate that rural consumers can afford to pay up
to five percent of household income on electricity and up to ten
percent on all energy use, such as candles, kerosene, and dry cell
and car batteries in un-electrification areas, ranging from three to
twenty U.S. dollars per month.11 When designing tariff struc-
tures for rural electrification projects, including mini-grids, a
principle should be born in mind that the tariff should at least
recover operation, maintenance, and management (“O&M&M”)
costs, and preferably partial capital investment costs.12
An adequate tariff structure for RE mini-grids should:13
• Recover at least O&M&M costs;
• Reflect cost structure — a high fixed charge (higher than
typical tariff structures applied in large grid systems) to
reflect fixed O&M&M costs, a variable charge to reflect
fuel costs, and a levelized capital cost charge partially
reflect capital investment costs; and
• Remain below consumers’ ability to pay. 
Following this principle, a fixed monthly fee may be a more
appropriate tariff scheme for RE mini-grids since it is more
directly related to the cost structure of a RE system, and it pro-
vides the operator with a clearer financial forecast. Other pricing
schemes such as pre-payment
and binary real time pricing as
well as new solutions for intelli-
gent metering, such as energy
dispensers and behavior-based
charge controllers, have been
applied in a few pilot RE mini-
grid projects. Such tariffs can be
differentiated by customer seg-
ments with different consump-
tion patterns in order to be more
proportionate to the customer’s
ability to pay.14 In addition,
community involvement is critical for RE mini-grids. Communi-
ties sometimes can pay up to ten to twenty percent of the capital
investment of RE mini-grids up front in the form of labor, mate-
rial, and cash.
Worldwide, almost all rural electrification programs involve
some form of subsidy. In principle, subsidies should be applied
to access costs (connections), not to operating costs (ongoing
consumption).15 Following the principle that tariffs should
recover O&M&M costs, while subsidies should buy down initial
investment costs, RE mini-grids can become more attractive
than diesel genset, because they require lower tariffs compared
to diesel generators and are less exposed to fuel price volatility.
Sometimes, in a remote area where the price of diesel is quite
high, the O&M&M costs for diesel generators can be higher
than the local consumers’ ability to pay. 
A CASE STUDY — CHINA RENEWABLE
ENERGY LAW
China has the largest renewable energy capacity in the
world, with an installed capacity of 42 GW in 2005, mostly
small hydroelectric power. At the Beijing International Renew-





able Energy Conference in 2005, the Chinese government
announced an ambitious target to achieve sixteen percent of
energy consumption from renewable energy by 2020, which is
equivalent to an installed capacity of 75 GW of small hydro, 30
GW of wind, and 30 GW of biomass. 
China passed Renewable Energy Promotion Law in Febru-
ary 2005, which took effect on January 1, 2006, making it one of
the first countries in the developing world to adopt mandated
market policies for renewable energy. The World Bank China
Renewable Energy Scaling-Up Program provided U.S. $213 mil-
lion in International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
loans and Global Environment Facility grants to assist China in
implementing the Renewable Energy Law and investing in wind
farms, biomass power generation, and small hydro plants. 
The development of the Chinese Renewable Energy Law
offers valuable insights and lessons on how RE policy instru-
ments are designed and applied in the real world. After carefully
examining the three options of the mandated market policies
through study tours and workshops, the Chinese government
decided to adopt the feed-in tariff approach in the Renewable
Energy Law that was passed in 2005. 
While the Renewable Energy Law in 2005 provided critical
principles and frameworks, it did not include detailed opera-
tional guidelines for implementation and enforcement, which
were left to be developed in the Implementation Regulations.
While feed-in laws have produced the highest RE penetration
rates and are relatively easy to administer, it is tricky to set up
the feed-in tariff level at the beginning, particularly when there
are no reliable cost benchmark data available on large-scale
commercial wind farms and biomass power plants from real
world experience in China. If the feed-in tariff is set too low, it
will not provide sufficient incentives to the investors, thereby
defeating the purpose. If the feed-in tariff is too high, it will cre-
ate high rent and not be cost-effective. In addition, considera-
tions in regional equity added another layer of complexity. Given
the wide variations in renewable energy resources, coal
resources, economic development status, and electricity tariff
levels among different regions, a question of whether the feed-in
tariff should be set at the national level with regional differences
or at provincial level also generated a major debate. Drafts of the
Implementation Regulation, circulated for public comments in
November 2005, had clearly stated that the wind power tariffs
would be set at baseline coal-fired power prices in each province,
plus a subsidy of RMB 0.23/kWh (U.S. $0.028 US/kWh).
Contrary to expectations, the Implementation Regulation
announced on January 1, 2006 did not apply the feed-in tariff to
wind power, only to biomass. Biomass power tariffs are set at
province-specific average coal prices plus a premium of RMB
0.25/kWh Chinese Renminbi, which is equal to three U.S. cents
per kilo-watt-hour (“cents/kWh”). Wind power tariffs, however,
are established through the ongoing concession process.16
The Chinese government introduced competitive bidding
for wind farm development in 2003, to steadily ramp up new
wind power capacity at the lowest possible costs. After years of
high wind electricity tariffs, the government hoped that such a
concession approach would drive down and reveal the cost of
wind farms in China. Under the Wind Power Concession pro-
gram, the National Development and Reform Commission
invited international and domestic investors to develop 100
megawatt (“MW”) wind farms on a potential wind site. Winning
bidders are granted approval to develop the selected project site,
a PPA for the first 30,000 hours of the project operation, guaran-
teed grid interconnection, financial support for grid extension
and access roads, and preferential tax and loan conditions by the
central government. This backing of the central government cre-
ates a comparatively lower-risk investment environment for
wind farm developers in China.17
The first round of bidding took place in October 2003, with
two projects awarded 200 MW. While the winning bid prices
were significantly lower than any previous wind farm price in
China, they were below the long-run marginal costs. The
selected developers experienced difficulties in obtaining financ-
ing, and project construction was delayed. The subsequent
rounds of bidding from 2004 to 2006 awarded an additional
2000 MW capacity.18 The winning bid price for the wind con-
cession projects to date ranged from 4.6 to 6.2 U.S. cent/kWh,
while current average cost of wind power in China is estimated
to be between 6.3 and 8 U.S. cent/kWh.19
To date, the concession caused a major concern to the wind
industry in China because the bidding process resulted in prices
that are too low to be financially viable. As a result, there are
reduced incentives for developers to invest in this nascent indus-
try. In addition, the number of companies attempting to bid for
the concession projects actually fell from the first round of con-
cessions to the second round, contrary to expectations that the
number of participants would increase with the program’s
increased visibility and the “success” of the first two conces-
sions. Furthermore, better wind resource measurement is needed
to decide the selection of concession sites and the bid prices. 
CONCLUSION
Renewable energy is an effective approach to mitigate cli-
mate change. Worldwide, renewable energy technologies are
growing rapidly and have become a mainstream industry. Devel-
oping countries have done more than expected to promote
renewable energy development, and China is a world leader on
renewable energy capacity. 
The key to success for renewable energy development is the
implementation of a sound legal, policy, and regulatory frame-
work that will attract large-scale investment in renewable energy.
Successful renewable energy policies must be long-term and
consistent; have a secure and predictable payment mechanism;
provide fair and open grid access; possess strong governance
conditions, clear administration procedures; and low transaction
costs; have strong public acceptance; and enforcement is key.
Countries should start simple in the design of energy policies,
and always remember that “the devil is in the details.”
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